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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
Aiuu;s'l'-RlGHT OF OFFICER 'l'O KILL WEEN SERVING WARRANT FOR MISDEMllANOR.-Defendant.Jtad a warrant for the arrest of one White, charging
him with being drunk and disorderly. When the defendant served the warrant, White advanced upon him with an open knife. Although the defendant
had a chance to escape through an open door, he shot and wounded White.
In the prosecution of defendant for shooting and wounding White, it was
held that the defendant was justified in shooting him. State v. Dunning
O~. C., 1919), 98 S. E. 530.
.
The ruie of the common law was that if an officer under the authority of
a warrant attempted to arrest a felon, he was justified in killing the felon
if he fled, but the officer could not justify the killing of a misdemeanant who
fled. And, irrespective of the question of self-defense, if either the felon
or misdemeanant resisted arrest, the rule was that the officer was justified
iµ opposing force to force, even though the death of the persons resisting
be the consequence. HAi.:£'s PLI>:AS OF THE CROWN (Small's lst Am. Ed.) 489;
F.AsT, PLUS oF THE CRowN (1716), 298; 4 Cool.Ev's BJ.AC.t{STONE, 4th Ed.,
Vol. 2, 1348; l RusSELL, CRt:M!lS, (9th Am,. Ed.} 893; CLARK, CRIMINAL I.Aw,
161-2. This view is supported on grounds of public policy and in justice to
the officer. And the common law nil~ is in general followed by the later
cases. State v. Smith, (felon resisted), (1905), 17// Ia. 534; Brown v. Weaver, (misdemeanant fled), (1898), 76 Miss. 7; Head v. Marten, (misdemeanant
fled) (1887), 85 Ky. 48<>; Commonwealth v. Rhoads, (misdemeanant fled),
(1903), 23 Pa. Supr. Ct., 512; Lynn v. People, (misdemeanant resisted),
(1897), 170 Ill. 57//; State v. Dierberger, (misdemeanant resisted}, (1888), g6
Mo. 666; VooRHEES, LAW OF Alm!lsT, 156-8. Among the modem cases there
are authorities, however, holding that the officer is ·not justified in killing a
misdemeanant who resists arrest unless in self-defense. Dilger v. Commonwi!alt11, (dicta), (1889), 88 Ky. 550; Smith v. State (1894), 59 Ark. 132; Clements v. State (1873), 50 Ala. li7; Holland v. State (1909), 162 Ala. 5. That
this rule may put the officer in a precarious position is shown in the Clements
Case, supra. There the party rei;isting arrest had made threats on the life
of the officer, and, though there was a- conflict in the evidence, it tended
to prove that the deceased had cocked and half drawn a pistol. The court
said that this was a preparation to resist, an attitude of defiance, not amountmg to an assault, which did not justify the officer's killing the deceased.
BILLS AND Notl!s-CoNFLICTING Dull DAT!ls.-Payee sued the maker's executors on an instrument substantially as follows: "December 12, 1891. One
day after date I promise to pay to the order of V. A. Zimmerman seven
thousand· dollars with interest from date, to be paid at my death. JAM'.£5 R.
ZD!M!lRMAN." Held, plaintiff nonsuit. The uncertainty in due dates was incurable and unexplained. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman (Pa., 1919), lo6 Atl. lg8.
The plaintiff had no evidence to explain the ambiguity between the two
inconsistent due dates or to indicate which one was intended. But the courts,
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even in the absence of extraneous evidence, will attempt by judicial interpretation to give a reasonable meaning to all the terms of an instrument. Washington County Bank v. Jerome, 8 Mich. 490. To do this they will insert an
omitted word. Nichols v. Frothingham, 45 Me. 220, where "months" was
supplied after "six" in a note reading "six after date we promise to pay."
Payments "on or before" a certain date are almost universally held enough
to satisfy the requirement for certainty in the due date of a note. Bank v.
Skeen, 101 Mo. 683. And "one day after date I promise to pay, or at my
death" has been held sufficient to make a note collectable eleven years after
the date on which made, the maker's death occurring at this latter time.
Conn v. Thornton, 46 Ala. 587. The court might have held the instrument
in the principal case a good note by implying the word "or" between the two
dates, on analogy with these cases.
BILLS AND NOT£s-HoLn1'R IN Du:i; CoURs£-CHtCK DtPOSIT£D WI'tH BANK
COI.Llte"l.'ION.-One White deposited a check for four hundred and forty
dollars with plaintiff bank. The deposit slip on which the check was.listed
contained the provision that "Items other than cash are received on deposit
with the express understanding that they are taken for collection only." Later
White drew out his entire balance including the provisional credit. Payment
on the check was stopped. Held, plaintiff was a holder in due course not
subject to equitable defenses. Old National Bank of Spokane v. Gibson
(Wash., 1919), 179 Pac. 113.
By the Laws of 1899, chapter 149, the State of Washington adopted the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. Under its provisions, the courts have
extensively developed the question as to the rights of a bank in paper held
for collection. Washington Brick etc. Co. v. Traders Nat. Bank, 46 Wash. 23.
Where provisional credit only has been given and no money advanced, the
general rule is that the bank has no interest in the paper, Belshiem v. First
Nat. Bank of White Salmon, 77 Wash. 552;-Morris-Miller Co. v. A. Von
Pressentin, 63 Wash. 74- A like rule prevailed under the Law Merchant;
Lawson, Mann et al. v. Second Nat. Bank of Springfield, 30 Kans. 412;
Manufacturers' Bank of Racine v. Newell, 71 Wis. 309; First Nat. Bank v.
Nelson, 105 Ala. 18o. However, where the bank· extends irrevocable credit
and assumes responsibility for the paper, it has been treated as a holder in
due course. Wheeler etc. v. First Nat. Bank of Battle Creek, 3 Tex. Ct. App.
Civ. Cas. 1!)2. Where advances made were in the nature of general credit
extended and not on the strength of the paper deposited, the bank has been
denied this protection. American Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Dennis,
90 Wash. 547. But where money is advanced in one form or another on the
-faith of paper deposited for collection, the courts have quite generally considered the bank to be a holder in due course and entitled to recover as
against latent equities. City Deposit Bank v. Green (Iowa) 103 N. W. g6,
130 Iowa 384, 1o6 N. W. 942; Shawtnut Nat. Bank v. Manson, 168 Mass. 425
(decided prior to the adoption of the statute in Massachusetts); Morrison
v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 90 Okla. 6g7. The result in the instant
FOR
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case may be said to be consistent with the general trend of the law. The
contract of conditional credit was changed· when the bank honored the depositor's check. In the tender and acceptance of the check without provision for
credit, the reasonable presumption would be that both parties considered this
transaction as changing the ownership of the paper.
BoYCOT'.l'-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEoNS-Rur;es OF-M:EDICAL ASSOCIATION.Defendant, British Medical Association, is an organization of medical men,
its object, as stated in its memorandum of incorporation, being "To promote
the medical and allied sciences, and to maintain the honor and interests of
the medical profession." Plaintiff had been practicing medicine since I895 and
had been a member of the Association. In I908 he was expelled from membership for having engaged in "contract practice", and thereupon the defendant
put into operation, pursuant to its rules, a "prolonged, deliberate and pitiless
boycott." This boycott or ostracism was so effective that throughout the
whple period of its operation plaintiff was unable to secure the services in
consultation of a single medical practitioner (with one exception) in his own
community or the territory thereabouts. "His private practice wa,s, in consequence, greatly injured, and he and the members of his family were treated
as social and professional outcasts." In action for the resulting damage held
plaintiff was entitled to recover. Pratt v. British Medical Association (I9I9),
I K. B. 244The judgment of McCardie, J., is an. able, thorough review of the authorities bearing on the problem of Allen v. Flood ( I8g8), A. C. 1; Qufon v.
J.;eathem (1901), A. C. 495, etc., and consideration of the principles underlying the determinations in such cases. The learned judge concludes that a
threat to inflict upon a man the slur of professional dishonor was as much
an "unlawful means" in injuring a person's business as is a threat to cause
a strike, "each may produce intimidation." That the self interest of the defendant and its members and the alleged desire to set a particular standard
of professional ethics were not a justification of what was done was deemed
equally clear. The judgment concludes that malice was not an essential element in plaintiff's action, but finds that there was proof of malice. The case
will be commented upon more fully in a subsequent issue of the Review.
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-A'NTl-fyPING STATuTts.-Plaintiff was arrested
for violation of the Iowa Code, Supplemental Supp. 1915, § 5028u, which provided that an~ employee of a hotel, barber-shop ,or other enumerated places
(sic) who should accept a tip or gratuity should be guilty of a misdemeanor.
The case arose on suit for a writ of habeas. corpus. Held, the statute was
unconstitutional. Dunahoo v. Hi1ber (Iowa, 1919), 171 N. W. 123.
The court 'held that there was no reasonable ground whatever for distinction between employees and employers so far as concerned preclusion
from accepting tips, and that, as the statute did not purport to restrict employers, if had not a "uniform operation" as required by the Iowa constitution, and did deny to employees that equal protection of the law prescribed
by the federal constitution. A dissenting opinion argued that "the tipping

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
evil, if such, is in its very nature a wrong by the employee against the employer * * *" and that in this there was sufficient gr<>und for classification.
Other decisions on anti-tipping statutes are noted in 17 M1cH. LAW IQ:v. g6.
CRIMINAL LAw-MOT10N IN Arou;s-r-IND1Cl'.MENT-NAMss oF PAR-rms.Defendant, Goldberg, was indicted in fifty counts for the illegal sale of liquor. In forty-nine of the counts his name was spelled correctly, in one of
~hem it was spelled Holdberg. He was convicted on all fifty counts, and
iuoved in arrest of judgment. The motion was denied in the trial court.
Held, reversed and remanded, the names not being idem sonans, the holding
must be reversed in toto. People v. Goldberg (Ill., 1919), 122 N. E. 530.
The decision is one of those which grate on the legal conscience as well
as add to the layman's arguments against the technicalities of legal prcr
cedure. To arrive at it the court took three steps. First: that Holdberg
and Goldberg are not idem so1wns. This is equivalent to saying that the
attentive ear would have no difficulty in distinguishing between them when
pronounced. Maier v. Brock, 222 Mo. 74- Second: that the objection was
correctly raised by a motion in arrest of judgment. Other courts h~ld that
this is too late to raise such an objection. See Verberg v. Stabe, 137 Ala. 73,
that a plea of not guilty is a waiver of the fact that the name is a misnomer;
and Commonwealth v. Dedham, 16 Mass. 141, that misnomer is only matter
of abatement, and not of arrest of judgment. Third: that the decision must
be reversed in toto. The court goes on the authority of People v. Gaul, 233
Ill 630. The United States Supreme Court seems to differ, holding that where
there is error in one count the verdict may still stand as to the rest. Ballew
v. United States, 16o U. S. 187.
Ca1:r.i:1NAL LAw-Nr:cr.1GsN'r AssAm,'r AND BA'rTtRY WI'rH AN AuroMOBIL~.
-Defendant was convicted of assault and battery. There was evidence tending to prove that he was driving an automobile in a closely built-up portion.
of a city at a speed of about thirty-five miles an hour and that, at a street
crossing which he knew to be dangerous, he struck and injured the prosecutor who was riding a motorcycle. Held, the evidence was sufficient to
support the convii;tion: affirmed on rehearing. Bleiweiss v. State (Sup. Ct.
of Ind., 1918, 1919), II9 N. E. 375; 122 N. E. 577.
The court quofes Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 6rg, as follows: "Intent, on
the part of the person charged, to apply the force constituting the battery, is
an essential element of the offense. But the intent may be inferred from
circumstances wihch legitimately permit it. It may be· from intentional acts
* * * done under circumstances showing a reckless disregard for the safety
of others. and a willingness to inflict the injury." The case thus rests on
the same theory as State v. Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15 (Supreme Court), 88 lb.
396 (Court of Errors), which was discussed at some length in 13 MICH. L.
IQ:v. 594- It seems obvious that, under the beneficent fiction of implied intent, we are developing a doctrine of negligent assault and battery, limited
perhaps to the grosser degrees of negligence (as negligent homicide often is),
and possibly excluding cases where there is no act save one of omission.
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In the first opinion in the principal case, the court seems to rest in part on
the doctrine of constructive intent, as applied to the violation of the speed
law. The inappropriateness of this doctrine is made clear by Commonwealth
v. Adams, n4 Mass. 323 (cited with approval in 177 Ind. 619, 629), and by
the opinion of the Court of Errors in the case of State v. Schutte, supra.
See also 17 MicH. L. low. 6o3..
DAMAc~ -TIPs INcr.un:im IN EsTIMATING DA11Acts oF AN EMP1.ons
WRONGFUI,J,Y D1sM1sstn.-The plaintiff 'Yas employed as a hair dresser by the
defendant, and in the ordinary course of his service he received tips from the
persons whom he attended. The defendant wrongfully dismissed him. Held,
~pat the plaintiff was entitled to include the loss of tips in the damages claimed as a result of the wrongful dismissal. Manubens v. Leon [I919], I K. B.
208.
.
The case involves a somewhat unique application of a familiar principle.
The dama'ges recoverable on a breach of contract are said to include such as
m"ay reasonably be considered as arising naturally from the breach of the
corrtract itself or such as may reasonably be supposed to have entered into
the contemplation of the parties when they made the contract Hadley v.
Ba~endale (~54), 9 Exch. 341. The application of this general ~rinciple to
cases involving loss of tips seems to be an open question on authority. There
ar~ a few analogies. It has been held, for example, that where the practice
of- tipping is open, notorious, and sanctioned by. the employer, such gratuities
may be included in estimating the "average weekly earnings" in respect of
which compensation is awarded under the English Workmen's Compensation
Act of lgOO. Penn v. Spiers & Bond [Igo8], I K. B. 766; Great Western
Railway Co. v. Helps [1918], A. C. 141. Ith~ also been held that an employee who turns over the tips received to his employer. under a mistake
as· to his rights~ may compel the employer to make restitution. Zappas v.
Ro11meliote '(19I2), 156 Ia. ·709; Polites v. Barlin (I912), 149 Ky. 376. So
long as an indulgent public is willing to toleratei the tipping system, it would
seem on principle that the law ought to take account of this kind of remuneration in estimating the damages to be awarded for breach of a service contract.

. ~_:_'fRAc:roR ON HIGHWAY-DANG!lROUS AGtNCY-DOCTRINt OF RYI.ANDS v. Fr.tTcHn.-A steam engine (presumptivelyi of the nature of a
steam tractor) was being driven by defendant along a highway and sparks
emitted from the engine sef fire to plaintiff's premises. The engine was
equipped with a special apparatus to prevent the emission of sparks. Held,
that since defendant was using a "dangerous fire-producing engine," the doctrine· of Rylands v. Fletcher, L R. 3 H. L. 330,. and Gunter v. James, 24
Times· L. R. 868, was· applicable; hence defendant was liable in damages for
the injury caused, although he was in no way negligent. Mansel v. Webb
(t9I8), 88 L. J. K. B. 323.
The principal case is significant in that the English courts have no compunction about confirming the extension of the application of a doctrine
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which had a peculiarly historical origin in cases of trespass by domestic
animals (see Tillett v. Ward, L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 17), which later was extended
to apply to the use of land (R:J•lands v. Fletcher, snpra), and which was finally
extended in its application to the use of inanimate chattels (Jones v. Festiniog
R·y., L. R. 3 Q. B. 733 and Powell v. Fall L. R. 5 Q. B. 597) ; a doctrine
which, in its extended application, "would impose a penalty upon efforts,
made in a reasonable, skilful, and careful manner, to rise above a condition
pf barbarism." Doe, J., in Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442. In a case similar
to the principal one the Supreme Court of Tennessee said that "the degree of
care required of one * * * with a steam thresher, in respect to setting fires,
is the same as that devolved upon railway companies in the use of their engines." Martin v. McCrary, us Tenn. 316; I L. R. A. (N. S.) 530. That
duty as laid down by the same court in a prior case is that "a degree of care
and prudence commensurate with the danger to which property is exposed
by them" must be used. "And when they have them prope_rly constructed
and equipped with spark arresters and appliances of the latest and most approved character to prevent tlle escape of coals and cinders, in good repair,
and carefully and skillfully handled, * * * they are not liable for property
unavoidably destroyed by escaping sparks and cinders." Louisville & N.
R'J. v. Fort, II2 Tenn. 432. In this matter the Tennessee court exemplifies
the weight of authority in America which asserts, while the English courts
repudiate, a hombook principle of the common law, vis., that "blame must
be impulable as a ground of responsibility for damage proceeding from a
lawful act." Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. L. 339.
LIABILITY Tei INJURED THIRD PARTY - PRox1CAuss.-Testatrix of a party killed by the collapse of a defective county
bridge, sues the company which, as independent contractor, constructed the
bridge for the county some five years before time of suit. Negligence and
knowledge of the defects are admitted by defendant's demurrer to the complaint. Held, that· in the absence of a showing that fraud, deception or fu-.
tentional concealment of defects was practiced by the contractor in obtaining acceptance of the bridge by the county, such acceptance was the intervention of an independent human agency which had the effect of breaking
the chain of causation between any negligence of the contractor and the
death of the third party, and defendant is therefore not liable to plaintiff
in this action. Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co. (Ind., 1919), 122 N. E. 1.
In exposition of its reasoning that acceptance by the county amounts to
the actual intervention of an independent human agency, the opinion of the
principal decision holds, inter alia, that, "In the class of cases to which the
one at bar belongs the work is generally done by the contractor in accordance with plans furnished by the party letting the contract or under his direction and supervision." But the court's comment is certainly not wholly in harmony with the legal conception of an independent contractor as, "One who
contracts to do a specific piece of work, furnishing his own assistants, and
executing the work either. entirely in accordance with his own ideas, or in accordance with a plan previously given him by the person for whom the work is
1ND£1'£ND£NT CONTRACTOR -
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done, without being subject to the orders of the latter in respect to the details
of the work'' 2() Cyl', 970. The county was, then, not bound to exercise
supervision and there is nothing in the facts which indicates that the work
was not directed solely by the contractor. The county did not consciously
accept the defects of· the bridge nor take to itself the negligence of the independent contractor. What happened in fact was a mere change of possession
and on this topic BIGti.ow, CAStS ON TORTS, 618, says: ''If the in.iury occurs
by reason of the defendant's default, what matters it that he had not control
over the thing at the time? The change of control is nothing, unless the
original defect has been increased thereby, so that it cannot be proved that
the original negligence of the defendant caused the damage." Granting, howe_ver, that the acceptance by the county and its subsequent failure to repair
the bridge constituted the intervention of an independent responsible agency
the question naturally presents itself : Does such intervention relieve the
contractor of the original liability which an application of the doctrine of
proximate cause inferentially admits? It would seem that the cond11ct of the
county can hardly be classed as other than that which the contractor was under obligation to anticipate and endeavor to prevent. He knew of the defects
and was also aware tb,at they were not discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Under these circumstances, it appears to be neither illogical nor unjust to hold that the contractor was bound to foresee the almost inevitable
result of<1his own neglect. Acceptance.by the county, subsistence of the inherent weaknesses of the bridge and consequent accidents, \'{ere in view of
the facts and from the defendant's standpoint, sequels "likely to happen in
the ordinary course of events." Stone v. Boston, etc., Railway Co., 171 Mass.
536, 540.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Rttn AMtNDMtNT-POwtR ol? STA'l't OFFICERS TO
, ARRtsT PttsoNS CARRYING LIQUOR THROUGH DRY STATts.-Defendant was indicted for carrying liquor into Virginia a dry state. The evidence furnished
in the bill of particulars showed that he was transporting liquor on a through
passenger ticket from Maryland to North Carolina. He was arrested while
the train stopped temporarily at Lynchburg, Va. On a motion to quash, it
was held that the Reed Amendment, rightly construed, did not embrace the
act which it was admitted thii.t the prosecution could prove. United States
v. Gudger (U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 408, April I4, 19I9).
The court said that the terms of the Reed Amendment did not prohibit
the movement of liquor in interstate commerce through a dry. state to another state. The temporary stop at Lynchburg, Va., was not enough to give
the liquor a situs therein or to interrupt the interstate commerce character of
the trip. Similarly it has been held that sheep being driven along the road
from one state to another were in ·interstate commerce and not subject to
the state's taxing power even though they grazed as they were driven. Kelley
v. Rhoads (I902), 188 U. S. 1. In cases on the question of the right of the
state to tax property temporarily within the state, though intended by the
shipper to be forwarded ultimately, the property w~s taken from the hands of
the carrier to serve some purpose of the shipper, as grading grain, People
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v. Bacon (1909), 243 Ill. 313, (affirmed 2Z7 U. S. 504), 44 L. R. A. (N. S.)
.~86; separating oil, General Oil Co. v. Crain (1908), 209 U. S. 2n; to allow
carload shipments, Merchants' Trans. Co. v. Des Moines (1905), 128 Ia. 732.
There was nothing in the instant case to divest it of its interstate character.
The suggestion that the construction adhered to would make evasion of the
law easy was rejected on the ground that a different holding would be "an
enactment hy constmction of a new and different statute". That the Reed
-"-mendment is a proper exercise by Congress of its power over interstate
'commerce see 17 MICH. LAW R£v. 511.
·
IN~·ox1cATING L1QuoR-RlCHT oil STATE TO PRoHmrT Poss:itssroN THtRtOF.
-The Georgia prohibitory law, approved in November, 1916, to become effective May 1, 1917, prohibited the possession of more than one gallon of intoxicating liquor. Under it the defendant was convicted of having in his possession more than the forbidden quantity. · He asserted that the liquor had been
acquired before May I, 1917; and contended that the statute, if construed to
apply to liquor so acquired, was void under the Fourteenth Amendment. It
was held that the defendant could not stay the exercise of the State's police
power by acquiring such property, and that the defendant, acquiring it after
the enactment of the statute, took it with notice of its· infirmity that its possession would become a crime. Barbour v. The State (U. S. Sup. Ct. No.
191, April 14, 1919), affirming Barbour v. The State (1917), 146 Ga. 667.
The majority of the early cases denied the right of the state to prohibit
the mere possession of liquor for personal use as violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. Kentucky v. Campbell (1909), 133 Ky. 50, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.)
172 and note; Kentucky v. Smith (1915), 163 Ky. 2Z;, L. R. A. 1915 D 172.
These cases considered that to deny the right of a person to possess liquor
was not reasonably necessary to protect the public health, public morals, or
public safety, and, consequently, an improper exercise of the police power
and the abridgement of the privileges and immunities. At this time the purpose of prohibition was said to be the abolition of the saloon and the prevention of general traffic therein, not the prevention of consumption. FRtuND,
PoLrc:it Powr:R, Sec. 453, 454- In Crane v. Campbell (1917), 245 U.S. 304, the
Supreme Court of the United States settled the question, upholding the right
of a state to prohibit possession of liquor, but it did not there appear when
the liquor was acquired. These decisions leave ·open the question of the
right of the state to make the mere possession -0£ liquor acquired before the
enactment of the statute a crime. As in the instant case, the court previously
held that this question was not before it. Barlermeyer v. Iowa (1873), 18
Wall. 129. In the state courts there is a conflict. In the early case of Wynehamer v. The People (1856), 13 N. Y. Rep. (Kernan) 378, a statute prohibiting traffic in intoxicating liquors was held void for the reason that the law
operated so rigidly on property innocently acquired under previous laws as
to amount to depriving the owner of his property. In Washington a pro·
hibitory law primarily purposing to prevent the sale and barter of intoxicating liquors, though also making possession thereof unlawfu~ was held not
to apply> to liquor acquired and possessed for personal use before the statute

710

MTCHIGAN LAW REVIEW

was enacted. Washington v. Eden (1916), 92 Wash. I. In Utah a very stringent statute made the possession of liquor unlawful and further abolished
all property rights therein. This statute was held c;onstitutional. Utah v.
Meek (1918) - Utah-, L. R. A. 1918 E, 943. The court said that the tendency of modern legislation, and the purpose of the act, was against the consumption of liquor; and, if the legislature deemed it necessary to enforce the
statute they were not going beyond their powers, citing Mug/er v. Kansas
(1887), 123 U. S. 623, and the Crane case, supra. It is submitted that the
view taken by the Utah Court is the correct one. If the legislature think it
an administrative necessity to the proper enforcement of and the prevention
of evasion of the prohibitory laws now designed to protect the community
against the evils attending the excessive consumption of liquor, it is constitutionally within their power to destroy property rights in liquor and make possession thereof a crime. Such extreme steps probably would not have been
countenanced when the view pertained that the best government was that
which governed least, but to-day the tendency is toward regulation. The Supreme Court has upheld a law forbidding possession of game during the
.closed season, though the game in question had beeri imported from Russia,
on the ground that without such prohibition or restriction any law for the protection of domestic game could successfully be evaded. Silz v. Hcsterberg
(1go6), 211 u. s. 31.
LoGs A:!'!D LocczNc-CoN'tRACT FOR SALE oF S'tANDING TIMBI!R WI'tH DSF1TIME FOR R.E:r.i:ovAL.-Plaintiff was the owner of timber under a deed,
but failed to remove the same within the time specified therein. Defendant
in possession of the land was sued for conversion of the timber. Held, that
plaintiff remained entitled after the expiration of the time limit but having
Jost his right.to immediate possession at the moment of conversion, the action
could riot be maintained. Long et al. v. Nadawal~ Lumber Company (Ala.,
1918), 81 So. 25.
.
The question of the rights of parties under so-called "timber contracts"
.after the lapse of a reasonable or stipulated time for removal has resulted in
an abundance of conflicting decisions. The general theory controlling is indicated in the case of Green v. Bennett, 23 Mich. 464, where the court concluded that if the instrument purports to make an absolute conveyance, provision for removal within a certain time is a coYenant and title remains in
the vendee, who may sue the vendor if the latter converts the trees; but
where the provision is a condition, the title revests on breach. Some difficulty may be experienced in determining whether or not the provision was
intended to operate as a condition or a covenant. Having once determined
this1 the courts are generally agreed that if the covenant be conditional, title
will revert. The difficulty arises where there is a prima facie conveyance in
fee. Alabama, as held in the instant case, is committed to the position there
taken as regards the disposition of the title. Ward v. Moore, 18o Ala. 403;
Goodson v. Stewart, 46 So. 239; Magnetic Oil Co. v. Marbiiry Lumber Co.,
104 Ala. 465. Other jurisdictions in accord with this principle are, New Jersey, Irons v. Webb.• 41 N. J. Law 203; Indiana, Halstead v. Jessup, 150 Ind. 85.
NIT£
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Probably the weight of authority is with the view that such stipulations can
only be considered as conditions, Young v. Cowan (Ark.), 204 S. W. 312;
Bennett v. Vinton Lumber Co., 28 Pa. Sup. Ct. 495; Hartley v. Neaves, 117
Va. 219; also reported and annotated in I Va. L. Reg. n. s. 25. Nor is a
provision for reversion necessary at least in Texas, see Adams v. Fidelity
Lumber Co., 201 S. W. 1034 and Georgia, Allison v. Wall, 121 Ga. 822. The
absence of such provision was held to prevent a reversion where no time wa$
fixed in Watt v. Baldwin, 6o Mich. 622. There is little ground for quarreling
with those courts which hold to the theory of reversion. Their decisions may
work a hardship on the holder of the timber rights but any other would
equally distress the owner of the land. The former is responsible for his
own predicament. To hold him entitled to harass and embarrass the landowner indefinitely by threatened trespasses or legal proceedings would in the
balance outweigh the. undoubtedly self-imposed hardship to the vendee. The
instant case is an illustration of the resuscitation of common law technicalities to ease the burden of deciding a hard case. The result is such as no sane
person would contemplate at the time of contracting. In Halstead v. Jessup,
supra, under similar circumstances, the court a.Ssuming the title to be in the
vendee, allowed him to recover from the landowner in conversion for refusing him permission to enter, cut and remove the timber. It is submitted that
the courts asserting the Alabama view must go the whole way as did the
Indiana court in Halstead v. Jessup. Litigants are no longer satisfied with
the determination of some nice point of law arising in their case, leaving the
substantial question at issue and the equitable rights of the parties unsettled.
SAI.ts-FAII.UM TO Dnxvr:a-Excust-CoNSTRUCTlON oF CoNTRACT.-Defendant sold wheat to plaintiff, contracting to deliver it "at" a certain public
warehouse by a stated time. Before this time defendant took the grain to
the warehouse, but as it-was full it was impossible for him to store it there.
This impossibility continued through the time in which delivery' was to be
made, and upon defendant declaring that he was relieved of his contract,
plaintiff sued for damages. Held, (Tor.MAN, J., dissenting), the impossibility
did not relieve the defendant. Farmer~ Grain & Supply Co. v. Lemley
(Wash., 1919), I78 Pac. 640.
With the exception of a few well known, and fairly welt defined, classes
of cases, the rule as generally laid down in the older cases and by the text
writers is that an intervening impossibility will not relieve the promisor on
his agreement. 2 BENJAMIN ON SALES, 748-753; 2 PARSONS ON CoNTRACTS
(2d. Ed.) 823. See supra, p. - ; lsaccson v. Starrett, 56 Wash. 18; Stees v.
Leonard, 20 Minn. 494. However, the courts are today tending to relax this
very stringent rule, relieving the promisor when it appears "that the contingency which makes the contract impossible of performance is such that the
parties to the contract, had they actually contemplated it, would probably
have regarded it as so obviously terminating the obligation as not to require
expression." I Cor.. L. R. 533; Clarksville Land Co. v. Harrima1~, 68 N. H.
374. See comprehensive annotation thoroughly reviewing the cases in L. R.
A. 19I6 F, IO. But no matter how this rule may be considered, it should be
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based, like all the rules of contract law, on the intention of the parties; and
it is this which the courts should seek. Hence, if by defendant's agreement
to deliver the grain "at" the warehouse it was the intention of the parties
that it should be delivered "in" the building, and it was the further understanding that defendant's promise to put it there was in the nature of an
absolute undertaking, the contingency which arose to prevent his performance shottld µot relieve him. The prevailing opinion impliedly assumes, and
probably correctly so, that the grain was: to be placed "in" the warehouse,
for it entirely ignores this consideration in construing the contract. The
dissenting opinion, however, holds that when defendant took the grain to the
warehouse he had done all that was required of him, and in support of this
~.ites Do-:kman v. Smith, 21 Ky>. (5 T. B. Mon.), 372, which holds that a
covenant to deliver tobacco "at'' a warehouse does not require the obligor
to deliver it "in" the warehouse. But in Halstead v. Woods, 48 Ind.· App.
127, where a note was made payable at a certain bank, it was held that it was
payable "in" the bank. See 1 WORDS AND PHRASts, 595.
·
-

WILI.S - Ex:i;:cuT10N - "PRJ>s:£NO: OF TtsT.ATRix". -The at_testation of the
will in question took place in a room connected with the room in which the
testatrix was by an archway about six feet wide. The testatrix could have
seen the attaching of the signatures had she had her eyesight; but she was
blind. The Missouri statute required ·a~estation in "the presence of the testator". Held, that the statute was sati~fied. . The rule .for a blind testator is
the same as that which would be applied to him if he had sight. The purpose
of the statute is that the testator may have knowledge that the witnesses
have signed the instrument which he intends as his will. This protection is
ordinarily afforded by observation-which a blind person cannot have. All
the other senses are inadequate to avoid the possibility· of substitution. The
statute does not require more for a biind person than for a person who can
see. Wade, J., dissenting. Welch v. Kirby (Circuit Ct. of App., 1918), 255
Fed. 451.
.
The court correctly states the purpose of the statute to be that the testator
may have knowledge that the instrument signed is the one which he intends
as his will. But sight is only one of the ways in which the testator may gain
this knowledge. It is no doubt the best assurance. Nevertheless, even vision
may not be entirely adequate in certain cases. The courts have set it down
as the exclusive test merely because it happens to be the usual and the safest
test. It is well established now that an attestation is in the presence of the
testator if he could have seen the act even though he did not see it done because of some indifference or indisposition to take visual notice. Re Snow,
128 N. C. loo; Hill v. Barge, 12 Ala. 687. However, these courts seem to ignore the fact that this knowledge may be gained by means of senses other
than. sight. · In Cunningham v. Cunningham, 8o Minn. l8o, the testator could
have seen if he had moved about two or three feet but the court held the
attestation to have beeii made in his presence because it was "within the testator's voice; he knew what was being done". The court cited with approval
the statement in Cook v. Winchester, 81 Mich. 581 that in the definition of
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the phrase "in the presence * * * due regard must be had to the circumstances
of each particular case. * * * If they sign within his hearing, knowledge, and
understanding, and so near as not to be substantially away from him they
are considered in bis presence''. The best expression of this view is found
in Aiken v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482, where the court said that the testator
must be "mentally observant of the specific act in progress.'' See also I11 rr!
Will of Hiram Allred, 170 N. C. 153, L. R. A 1916, C. 946; Ann. Cas. 1916 D,
188; Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass. 238. To say the least, the vision test is hardly
consistent with itself. According to this test the statute is not satisfied if
the testator could not move his head into the line of vision by reason of
some infirmity; or could not see the act because his vision was obstructed
by a curtain or the foot-board of his bed. Gordon v. Gilmire, 141 Ga. 347.
Is not blindness as much an obstruction to the vision as a curtain or a board?
Yet in one case the testator is afforded all ·the possible means of minimizing
the possibility of fraud while in the other the testator·is guaranteed only an
imaginary safeguard. It would seem that the dissenting view attains more
completely the "rational, practical -construction" which the prevailing view
asserts as the ideal. The principal case is supported by the case of Piercy's
Goods, l Rob. Eccl. R. 278.
WILLS-°R£voCATlON-AnOP'tI~ CHILD-"Issui>.''-The testator adopted a
child in compliance with the provisions of the statute. He had no children
by his first wife and remarried after the adoption. He then made his will.
After his death a posthumous child of the second marriage was born. A
section of the statute of wills read as follows: "That every last will and
testament made when the testator had no issue living, wherein any issue he
might have is not provided for or mentioned, if at the time of his death he
leave a child, or children, or issue, or leave his wife enceinte of a child or
children which shall be born, such will shall ·be void, and such testator be
deemed to die intestate." The will was objected to in a caveat filed really
on behalf of the adopted c\illd. Held, that the will was void, having been
.revoked by force of the statute. The adopted child was not an "issue"
within the meaning of the statute of wills, hence there was no living issue
at the time of the making of the will. When the section of the statute of
wills above mentioned was enacted there was no adoption statute and consequently adopted children could not have been intended to be included. Moreover, the adoption statute did not clothe the adopted child with all the legal
incidents of a child born in lawful wedlock. In re Book's Will, 105 Atl. 878,
(Percg. Ct. of N. J., Nov., 1918).
When adoption by statute first came into practice the legislatures hesitated
to endow the child with all the legal incidents of a natural born child. The
attitude of the legislatures was restrictive hence the interpretation of the
courts was also restrictive. To-day adoption is the common thing and that
feeling of reluctance to put the adopted child on the same plane with the
natural child is no longer present in the minds of the legislatures. But unfortunately the courts are one step behind the legislatures, as is often the
case, and the restrictive interpretation still continues. It is only when the
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statute is precisely explicit that the courts come round to the modern ideas
about adoption. Thus, in Massachusetts the statute provided that the adopted
child should be deemed for the purposes of inheritance "and all other legal
consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parent and child" the
child of the parents by adoption the same as if he had been born to them in
lawful wedlock. Consequently, the court held in Sewall v. Roberts, .n5 Mass.
262, that an adopted child was included within the term "children" in a voluntary settlement made long prior to the adoption. See also In the Matter
of Wardell, 57 Cal. 484; Flannigan v. Howard, 200 Ill. 3g6, 59 L. R. A. 664But the adoption statute in the principal case said nothing about the legal
consequences and incidents of adoption being the same as if born in lawful
wedlock; it merely enumerated certain rights consequent on the adoption~ducation, maintenanc-e, and the rights of inheritance and the distribution of
the personal estate as if born to the parents in lawful wedlock. The court
admitted that the adopted child would come within the terms of a descent
or distribution statute so long as the adoptive statute gave the child the right
to take; however, the reason which allowed this. would not apply to cases
arising under the statute of wills. This discrimination is hardly warranted.
There is no apparent reason why the court should conclude that the legislature intended to apply a different rule as to the rights of an adopted child
in the case of testacy from the case of intestacy. It all hinges around the
interpretation of the word "inheritanc~" used in the adoptive statutes. In
view of the modem ideas about adoption, this narrow construction fails to
reach the real intent. of the legislature. On authority the principal case is
correct, and indeed has little opposition to dispute it. Let us hope for a case
which meets the issue squarely.

